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CRIMINAL LAW-MAIL FRAUD REQUIRES Loss OF PROPERTY
OR MONEY. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
Shortly after his election, the governor of Kentucky gave How-
ard P. "Sonny" Hunt, Jr., the state chairman of the Democratic
Party, de facto control over the selection of the insurance agent from
which the State would purchase its policies. Hunt selected Wombwell
Insurance Company of Lexington, Kentucky (Wombwell) after
Wombwell agreed with Hunt to "kick back" a percentage of the re-
sulting commissions in excess of $50,000 a year in exchange for a con-
tinued agency relationship. Hunt designated twenty-one separate
insurance agencies to receive these "excess commissions" from
Wombwell.' Seton Investments, Inc., (Seton) was one of the busi-
nesses designated to receive funds from the kickback. Hunt and
James E. Gray, a member of the governor's cabinet with the express
authority to select and oversee the state's insurance agent, owned and
controlled Seton. Charles J. McNally, a private businessman, acted as
the frontman for Seton. Wombwell sent payments of over $200,000 in
"excess commissions" through the mail to Seton. Neither Hunt nor
Gray disclosed the "kickback" arrangement to anyone in state
government.
The United States charged Hunt with mail fraud, tax fraud, and
conspiracy. Hunt pleaded guilty to the charges and received a sen-
tence of three years' imprisonment.2 The United States charged Gray
and McNally with conspiring to and committing mail fraud' by devis-
1. The vice president of Wombwell agreed to and maintained this same arrangement
with political leaders in the previous administration. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290
(6th Cir. 1986). The patronage system and its place as an institution in American politics is
discussed in Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary
Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117, 144
(1981).
2. "Although unclear from the case, Hunt also pleaded guilty to conspiracy." Telephone
interview with Jane Graham, Assistant United States Attorney, Lexington, Kentucky (Nov. 5,
1987).
3. The United States originally charged the defendants with seven counts of mail fraud,
six of which the district court dismissed. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d at 1293-94. The six
counts dismissed were based on the mailing of Seton's tax returns. Id. at 1294. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court properly dismissed the six counts of
mail fraud because mailings required by law cannot constitute the basis for liability under 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), unless the documents themselves are false. Id. at 1298 (relying on Parr
v. United States, 363 U.S. 370 (1960) ("mailings of documents which are required by law to be
mailed, and which are not themselves false and fraudulent, cannot be regarded as mail for the
purpose of executing a fraudulent scheme")). After the district court dismissed the six counts
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ing a scheme to defraud the citizens of the state of their right to have
the government's business conducted honestly and obtaining money
and other things of value by false pretenses and the concealment of
material facts.4 The district court instructed the jury that this scheme
could be established by either of two sets of findings: (1) that Hunt
had de facto control over the award of the insurance contract to
Wombwell, that he directed payments from this contract to Seton,
that this arrangement benefitted him personally and monetarily, that
he failed to disclose this arrangement and his interest in Seton in per-
sons in state government, and that Gray and McNally aided and abet-
ted him; or (2) that Gray had supervisory authority regarding the
selection of the insurance agent at a time when he received payments
through Seton, that he failed to disclose the facts regarding
Wombwell and his interest in Seton to persons in state government,
and that McNally aided and abetted him. The jury found Gray and
McNally guilty of conspiracy and mail fraud.
Because the jury did not specify which of the two findings it
predicated guilt upon, Gray and McNally appealed their convictions
arguing that Hunt did not hold public office, had no fiduciary duty to
the public, and therefore could not have "defrauded" the public.5
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, relying on the
intangible rights doctrine. According to this doctrine, courts can hold
persons such as public officials, who owe a fiduciary duty to the pub-
lic, criminally liable under the mail fraud statute if they engage in
schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and
impartial government. Although Hunt did not hold a formal public
office, the Sixth Circuit extended the fiduciary duty to him because he
of mail fraud, one count of conspiracy and one count of mail fraud remained. 790 F.2d at
1294.
4. The indictment uses the language taken from the original false pretenses statute. See
infra note 18.
5. 790 F.2d at 1295. The appeal challenged liability under § 1341 predicated on Hunt's
fiduciary status as a de facto public official. Id. According to a long line of cases, § 1341
proscribed schemes by public officials to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest
and impartial government. See, e.g., United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1005-06 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362
(4th Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909
(1974); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574
(1941). Because Gray was an elected official, Gray and McNally clearly are liable according to
the foregoing authority. Only the Second Circuit extended the fiduciary status and duty to an
individual without public office (such as Hunt) who has a special relationship with the govern-
ment and in fact makes government decisions. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983). Gray and McNally challenge the validity of that
extension. 790 F.2d at 1295.
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substantially participated in governmental affairs by exercising exclu-
sive control over the awarding of the state's insurance contracts. The
court of appeals held that the district court properly convicted Gray
and McNally since the fiduciary duty of one member in a conspiracy
extends to all members.6
The United States Supreme Court reversed, expressly rejecting
the intangible rights doctrine. The Court held that the mail fraud
statute protects only property rights. McNally v. United States, 107 S.
Ct. 2875 (1987).
The Federal Mail Fraud Statute7 originated in 1872 as part of an
act 8 which consolidated and recodified the postal laws.9 The provi-
sion in the statute which proscribes "any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud" had no predecessor. I0 Section 1341 retains this language
today. "
The legislative history of the mail fraud statute is sparse. Con-
gressman Farnsworth, the sponsor of the legislation, stated that the
section was intended "to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten
up in the large cities .. .by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions gener-
ally, for the purposes of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in
the country."' 2 This background suggests that the term "fraud" was
not used in a new or technical way, but rather that it carried the con-
ventional meaning of the term.' 3
6. 790 F.2d at 1295 (citing United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962, 964 (7th Cir.
1984)).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Section 1341 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, represen-
tations, or promises ... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or at-
tempting so to do [uses the mails or causes them to be used] ... shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
8. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
9. Id. See also Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DuQ. L. REV. 771,
779-86 (1980); Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption Prosecutions
Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 562, 567 (1980).
10. See M. BEAMAN & A. McNAMARA, INDEX ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL STATUTES,
1789-1873, 525-46 (1909) (cited in Comment, supra note 9, at 567 n.35); Rakoff, supra note 9,
at 779.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
12. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870); Comment, supra note 9, at 568. The
remarks were made during the debate on the recodification legislation introduced during the
41st Congress. The recodification bill was not passed by the 41st Congress, but was reintro-
duced and passed by the 42nd Congress with the anti-fraud section intact. Act of June 8, 1872,
ch. 335, §§ 149, 301, 17 Stat. 302, 323; Comment, supra note 9, at 568 n.47.
13. See Comment, supra note 9, at 568. "[Iln the nineteenth century, the prominent
forms of fraud were embezzlement, false pretenses, forgery, and larceny by trick." Id. at 573.
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Congress amended the mail fraud statute in 1889 to prohibit spe-
cific schemes with names such as "Green Articles," "Green Goods,"
or "Green Cigars" which involved counterfeit currency. 4 A typical
scheme involved a solicitation of one dollar bills with a promise of an
exchange for bills of a higher denomination. The exchanged bills
turned out to be counterfeit.'" The amending legislation, which uses
specific language, shows that the original prohibition proscribed con-
ventional types of fraud and was never intended as a broad prohibi-
tion of all schemes to defraud. 6
The United States Supreme Court interpreted "a scheme to de-
fraud" in Durland v. United States,'7 decided in 1896. The defend-
ant's scheme in Durland involved false promises about the future
return on bonds which he had for sale. The defendant argued that the
statute received only those cases which came within the common law
definition of false pretenses. 8 At common law, fraud involved the
misrepresentation of existing fact, not the false promises as to a future
event. The court rejected this argument, stating that "[tihe statute is
broader than is claimed. Its letter shows this: 'Any scheme or artifice
to defraud.' Some schemes may be promoted through mere represen-
tations and promises as to the future, yet are none the less schemes
and artifices to defraud."' 9
Congress codified the holding of Durland in 1909.20 It added the
words "or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises" after the original
clause "any scheme or artifice to defraud."'2' The sponsor of the
14. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873; Comment, supra note 9, at 568-69.
15. For typical cases which dealt with the counterfeiting schemes at which the statute was
aimed, see generally People v. Marvin, 29 N.Y.S. 381 (Sup. Ct. 1894) and People v. Reilly, 4
N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
16. Comment, supra note 9, at 569.
17. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
18. Id. at 310-13. "A criminal false pretense is a false representation of a past or existing
fact, which is calculated and intended to deceive, and does in fact deceive, and by means of
which one person obtains value from another without compensation." 35 C.J.S. False Pre-
tenses § 1 (1960); see also 30 GEO. 2, c. 24, § 1 (1757) (The original English false-pretenses
statute, which is part of the common law in some American jurisdictions, provides "all persons
who knowingly and designedly, by false pretence or pretences, shall obtain from any person or
persons, money, good, wares, or merchandizes, with intent to cheat or defraud any person or
persons of the same.. . shall be... fined and imprisoned.") (cited in Comment, supra note 9,
at 574 n.71).
19. 161 U.S. at 313.




amendment stated that the Act was self-explanatory.22
After Durland the lower federal courts began to expand the
scope of the mail fraud statute. This expansion 23 occurred primarily
in three ways. First, the lower courts interpreted the mail fraud stat-
ute broadly based on the authority of Durland24 and construed the
phrase "a scheme or artifice to defraud" broadly." As a result,
schemes contrary to public policy 26 and those that failed to measure
up to accepted moral standards and notions of honesty and fair play27
came within the ambit of the mail fraud statute.
Second, the courts expanded the mail fraud statute by analogiz-
ing it to fraud under section 37 1,28 which criminalizes any conspiracy
"to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
22. 42 CONG. REC. 1026 (1908) (remarks of Senator Heyburn); Comment, supra note 9, at
569 n.51.
23. The reason this expansion occurred is because "where legislatures have sometimes
been slow to enact specific prohibitory legislation, the mail fraud statute has frequently repre-
sented the sole instrument of justice that could be wielded against the ever-innovative practi-
tioners of deceit." Rakoff, supra note 9, at 772. In combatting a numerous catalog of
fraudulent offenses, the mail fraud statute is popular with prosecutors:
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradiva-
rius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true love. We may
flirt with RICO, show off with lOb-5, and call the conspiracy law "darling," but we
always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptabil-
ity, and comfortable familiarity.
Id at 771. Other possible reasons for the expansive use of § 1341 are discussed infra note 80.
24. United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1247 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976) (Durland relevant
to intangible theory because Durland recognized that Congress intended a broad definition of
fraud in the statute, broader than the definition of fraud at common law); United States v.
States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974) (Courts should
construe the definition of fraud in § 1341 broadly and liberally to further the purpose of the
statute.); United States v. Buckner, 108 F.2d 921, 926 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 669
(1940) (citing Durland as holding that the term "defraud" must be construed broadly).
25. See, e.g., Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916). "Whatever the limits to its
power, it may forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary
to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not." Id at 393. The Court interpreted
broadly the constitutional power of Congress to use § 1341 to punish conduct deemed contrary
to public policy. Nevertheless, Badders is cited as interpreting the concept of fraud broadly.
United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 124 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983)
(the mail fraud statute was enacted to prohibit the use of the mails for promoting schemes
deemed contrary to federal public policy); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1361 (4th
Cir.), aff'd en banc in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980) (scheme to defraud includes those that are contrary to public policy); McLendon v.
Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1507 (D.N.J. 1985) (a scheme is fraudulent if it
contravenes important public policies).
26. See Badders, 240 U.S. at 393.
27. See Blachy v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967); Gregory v. United
States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
UALR LAW JOURNAL
for any purpose." In Haas v. Henkel29 the United States Supreme
Court, interpreting the predecessor to section 371,30 held that a con-
spiracy to defraud the government includes the situation where a gov-
ernment official is bribed in return for an advanced disclosure of a
cotton crop report. 3 ' The Court noted that "it is not essential that
such a conspiracy shall contemplate a financial loss .... The statute
is broad enough in its terms to include any conspiracy for the purpose
of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any de-
partment of Government. 32 In Hammerschmidt v. United States
33
the Court defined a conspiracy to defraud as one which must "inter-
fere with or obstruct . . . lawful governmental functions by deceit,
craft or trickery."' 34 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Isaacsa3 cited both Haas and Hammerschmidt as sup-
port for the intangible rights doctrine.36
Finally, the lower federal courts expanded the mail fraud statute
by reading the phrase "or for obtaining money or property" as sepa-
rate and independent from the phrase "any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud."3a7  By reading the phrases as independent and not
complementary it was unnecessary to prove a loss of tangible property
in order to obtain a conviction under the mail fraud statute.38
The first clear appearance of the intangible rights doctrine came
in Shushan v. United States.39 The United States charged the defend-
ants with executing a scheme to defraud the Louisiana Parish Levee
Board of money by accepting kickbacks from the underwriters of a
plan to refund the outstanding bonds of the Levee District. A former
board member, a current member, and three other defendants con-
spired to charge an exorbitant fee for the refunding services subse-
quently rendered.' The conspirators bribed the current member of
the board to persuade the other nonconspiring members to agree to
the refunding. The court held that these actions resulted in a breach
29. 216 U.S. 462 (1910).
30. REV. STAT. § 5440 (1878).
31. 216 U.S. at 462-63.
32. Id. at 479.
33. 265 U.S. 182 (1924).
34. Id. at 188.
35. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
36. Id. at 1150.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085
(1984); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974);
United States v. Classic, 35 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. La. 1940).
38. 732 F.2d at 1152; 488 F.2d at 764.
39. 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
40. Id. at 114-15.
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of fiduciary duty by all the defendants to the board and to the public,
and enunciated the basis for the intangible rights doctrine: "[n]o
trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to
obtain an advantage by corrupting such an one [sic] must in the fed-
eral law be considered a scheme to defraud."4 Although the Levee
Board in Shushan suffered economic loss as a result of the fraudulent
scheme, the court did not ground its decision on that fact.42 Subse-
quent cases involving political corruption rely on the intangible rights
doctrine.4"
Fiduciary fraud, such as that condemned in Shushan, is the
"most significant and expansive use of section 1341" 44 and is often
invoked in successful prosecutions against both public officials45 and
private employees.46 Under Shushan and cases following it, a public
official may be convicted of defrauding citizens of his honest and
faithful services .4  This "scheme to defraud" need not result in actual
monetary or property loss to the victim,48 nor must it be contrary to
state law.49
41. Id. at 115. Other courts embraced this language as stating the basis of the intangible
rights doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 546 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
42. 117 F.2d at 115.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (congressman from
Michigan), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th
Cir.) (governor of Maryland), aff'd en banc in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975) (Chicago
alderman); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974) (former governor of Illinois).
44. Morano, The Mail-Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 45,
60 (1980).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982) (political party
leader without official government office), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v.
Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975) (city official fails to disclose material information), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (securities trader mis-
appropriates confidential inside information), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States
v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (member of law firm conceals involvement with a
client's competitor), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508
(7th Cir.) (payment by supplier of kickbacks to employer's agent), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827
(1973); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, (D. Mass. 1942) (defendant
bribes competitors' employees to obtain trade secrets).
47. United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909
(1974).
48. United States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380, 384 (E.D. La. 1969).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 124; United States v. Mandel, 591
F.2d 1347, 1361 (4th Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 909 (1974).
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In United States v. Margiotta 50 the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit extended the fiduciary duty to an unelected quasi-public
official. Margiotta, the Republican Party Chairman of Nassau
County, Long Island, and the Town of Hempstead, New York, di-
rected a patronage appointee to "kickback" payments to Margiotta
and other party officials. The payments were rebates on insurance
commissions paid by Nassau County to the appointee in his official
position. The court discussed two tests to measure fiduciary status:
(1) a reliance test, where one is a fiduciary if others rely upon him
because of his "special relationship" in the government,5" and (2) a de
facto control test, under which a person is a fiduciary if he in fact
makes government decisions.52 The court found that Margiotta was a
fiduciary under both tests.5 3
In the private sector, the intangible rights doctrine can be traced
to United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.54 In Proctor & Gamble, the
competitor of a corporation bribed an employee of the corporation to
obtain trade secrets. The employee sent the information through the
mail. The district court held that causing the disloyalty of an em-
ployee can constitute mail fraud and concluded that whoever causes
the employee to breach that duty is defrauding the employer of a law-
ful right.5 Following Proctor & Gamble lower federal courts held
that the employee deprived his employer of his honest and faithful
services if the employee failed to disclose material information of
outside or conflicting interests which potentially had an impact on the
employer.5 6 The failure to disclose breached the employee's fiduciary
duty to his employer. Under the intangible rights doctrine of fiduci-
ary fraud, a nonfiduciary, who aids and abets the fiduciary breaches of
an employee, is criminally liable under the mail fraud statute.
57
A few federal courts limited the application of the intangible
rights doctrine. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Bush 58 pointed out that a mere breach of duty with-
50. 688 F.2d 108, 122 (2d Cir. 1982).
51. Id. at 122.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942) (cited in Coffee, supra note 1, at 128 n.60).
55. Id. at 678.
56. United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915
(1982); United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998
(1981); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
57. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
58. 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
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out deception or a material misrepresentation is not fraud.59 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Rabbitt 60
required that the charge of fiduciary fraud against an elected public
official relate directly to the duties of the office itself.6' In United
States v. McNeive 6 2 the Eighth Circuit required a showing of mone-
tary loss by a victim to convict an employee in the private sector.63
Also, several commentators have criticized the expansion of the mail
fraud statute." The criticism includes concerns with due process 65
and fair notice,66 misinterpretation of Congress' original intent in
passing section 1341,67 and concerns with the breadth and possible
abuse of criminalizing fiduciary breaches under section 1341.68
The United States Supreme Court in McNally v. United States6 9
limited the expansion of the mail fraud statute. Justice White, writing
for the Court, reasoned that even though the legislative history is
sparse, "it indicates that the original impetus behind the mail fraud
statute was to protect the people from schemes to deprive them of
their money or property. ' 70 Durland, which interpreted the statutory
language "any scheme or artifice to defraud," is "interpreted broadly
insofar as property rights are concerned" but not beyond that.7 ' The
Court found that the codification and amendment in 1909 "gave fur-
ther indication that the statute's purpose is protecting property
59. Id. at 648. See also United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 827 (1973). Cf Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (a transaction that is
adequately disclosed cannot be attacked under rule lOb-5 no matter how unfair its terms).
60. 583 F.2d 1014, 1024 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
61. Id.
62. 536 F.2d 1245, 1250 (8th Cir. 1976).
63. Id.
64. See generally Coffee, supra note 1; Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Contin-
uing Story of the "Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983); Hur-
son, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Approach, 20 AM. CRiM. L. REV.
423 (1983); Morano, supra note 44; Comment, Federal Prosecution of Elected State Officials for
Mail Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an Affront to Federalism?, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 63 (1978);
Comment, supra note 9.
65. Morano, supra note 44, at 87. Instead of using § 1341 as a stopgap, Congress should
draft laws that specify the abuses it wants eradicated. Only in this way can the competing
objectives of punishing corruption and respecting due process rights be achieved. Id.
66. Coffee, supra note 64, at 16. The mail fraud evolution covering any new form of
misbehavior without the need for congressional action is fundamentally at odds with the prin-
ciple of fair notice and with the maxim of strict construction of penal statutes. Id.
67. Comment, supra note 9, at 587. The use of § 1341 in the intangible rights doctrine
against corrupt politicians is contrary to Congress' original intent when passing the statute.
Id.
68. See generally Coffee, supra note 1.
69. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
70. Id. at 2879.
71. Id. at 2880.
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rights."' 72 The added phrase "or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises"
appears separate from the "scheme . . . to defraud. '73 Because the
two phrases identifying the described schemes appear in the disjunc-
tive, the Court noted "it is arguable that they are to be construed
independently. ' 74  But the codification of the holding in Durland
gives no indication that Congress departed from the common under-
standing that "to defraud" referred to deprivation of property or
something of economic value. 75 Additionally, the Court reasoned, if
there are "two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher
than the other, we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has
spoken in clear and definite language."' 76 The Court limited the scope
of section 1341 to the protection of property rights77 because the stat-
ute's outer boundaries were ambiguous and fostered unwarranted fed-
eral involvement in state and local government. 8
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that the Court's ruling in Mc-
Nally rejects a "longstanding construction of the statute. ' 79 The mail
fraud statute was often the stopgap against newly-conceived forms of
fraud until Congress passed appropriate legislation.80 Despite Justice
Steven's concern the impact of McNally is limited since the prosecu-




75. Id. at 2881. The Court distinguished the definition of "to defraud" in § 1341 from
§ 371 fraud.
Section 371 is a statute aimed at protecting the Federal Government alone; however,
the mail fraud statute, as we have indicated, had its origin in the desire to protect
individual property rights, and any benefit which the Government derives from the
statute must be limited to the Government's interests as property-holder.
Id. at 2881 n.8.
76. Id. at 2890.
77. Id. at 2881.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Burger gave examples of how § 1341 has been used as a stopgap: (1) To prosecute securities
fraud, until the passage in 1933 of the Securities Act; (2) to prosecute loan sharks, until the
enactment in 1968 of 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96, outlawing extortionate extension of credit; (3) to
prosecute fraud in the sale of undeveloped land, until the passage of the Interstate Land Sale
Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1701 in 1969; and (4) to prosecute fraud connected with
credit cards, until the passage of 15 U.S.C. § 1644 in 1970. He noted further that, even with
the passage by Congress of specific laws to prevent fraud in specific spheres, the mail fraud
statute continues to play an important supplemental role in prosecuting such fraud. Id. at 405-
08 (cited in Morano, supra note 44, at 48 n.5).
MAIL FRAUD
Most earlier cases, including the corruption cases which invoked the
intangible rights doctrine, involved an economic loss.
McNally left open the question of what constituted a "loss of
property." In Carpenter v. United States,8 decided in November,
1987, the Supreme Court held that intangible property rights were
protected under section 1341.82 The intangible property right in Car-
penter was confidential information which belonged to a newspaper.
The Court distinguished this intangible property right from the intan-
gible right to honest and impartial government which the Court in
McNally rejected as beyond the scope of section 1341. "This is not a
case like McNally, however. The Journal ... was defrauded of much
more than its contractual right to his honest and faithful service, an
interest too ethereal in itself to fall within the protection of the mail
fraud statute. '8 3 The gray area between an intangible contractual
right which is unprotected (e.g. the employee's honest and faithful
services) and an intangible protected property right (e.g. confidential
information) warrants further delineation.
The significance of McNally is that it sends a clear signal to states
concerning federal involvement in state and local government.8 4
States must now take the lead in legislating against and prosecuting
their own fraud cases involving intangible rights.
Marilyn L. Byington
81. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). Defendant Winans wrote an investment advice column for the
Wall Street Journal. The newspaper had a rule that the column's contents were confidential
information which belonged to the Journal prior to publication. Winans and two others used
the advance information to buy and sell stocks based on the column's probable impact on the
market. The Court held that this constituted a "scheme to defraud" under § 1341. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 320.
84. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987).
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